By Peter Grier 东篱 选注

　　For nearly 25 years, US presidents have struggled to broker peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. A special report retraces the successes and breakdowns...

　　As he sat at the evening banquet, held outside in the soft air of Washington's spring, President Jimmy Carter<注1> was thrilled to see bitter enemies welcome each other as friends. Earlier that day—March 26, 1979—President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel had signed the Camp David accords<注2>, formally ending the state of war that had existed between their countries for 31 years. Now, they were mingling on the White House lawn, glasses and plates in hand, swapping tales of old wars.<注3>

　　At one point, Shaul, son of Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, approached the head table to pay his respects. While serving with Israeli forces years earlier, Shaul had been severely wounded by Egyptian fire. But on this night, the leader of Egypt's armies, Mr. Sadat himself, rose and embraced him.That heady moment may represent the high point of American peacemaking in the Middle East.<注4>

　　Just ask President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell. They might say that today the Mideast "burden" is as heavy as ever.

　　Virtually every US President since Carter has entered office determined to avoid mediation in one of the most explosive areas of the world. Virtually all ended their terms hip-deep in the search for solutions to the conflict between Israel on the one side and Palestinians and Arab states on the other.<注5>

　　Why is this so? The combatants themselves push it, for one thing. The United States has historic ties to both Israel and moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia.<注6> The Israelis tend to distrust the European Union, Russia, and most other possible mediators. The Palestinians believe that only the US has the power to get Israel to do something it doesn't really want to do.

　　Also at stake<注7> are US national interests in the region. A conflagration in the Mideast would threaten the industrial world's access to Gulf oil.<注8> It could threaten the security of Israel, a state with strong cultural and political ties to America. During the cold war, US officials worked hard to limit Soviet influence with the Arabs. Truth be told, they probably want to muscle out<注9> other big-power rivals, even benign ones, today.

　　But there may be an "X" factor<注10> at work as well. A cold calculation of geopolitics does not explain Jimmy Carter poring endlessly over maps of the Sinai, personally drawing possible lines of Israeli-Egyptian disengagement.<注11> It does not explain why President George Bush's Secretary of State, James A. Baker, would sit through a 9-1/2 hour meeting with Syria's Hafez al-Assad (Mr. Baker's aides invented "important" phone calls so they could use the lavatory).<注12>

　　Nor do policy concerns entirely explain President Clinto devoting more time to face-to-face Mideast peace negotiations than any US leader, ever, even as the prospect of success receded<注13> in the distance.

　　In the end, US presidents and their closest aides can become personally immersed in the Mideast peace process. It is big. It is interesting. Their views matter. Presidents drive US policy, serving as the swing vote between a reliably pro-Israeli Congress and a State Department bureaucracy more in tune with Arab views.<注14>

　　George W. Bush hasn't yet gone as far down this road as did Bill Clinto —or even Bush's father. But having inserted his administration into the search for an end to the current round of violence ... well, has there been a recent White House that became less involved with the search for Mideast peace, over time?

　　"The bottom line is that for 35 years, the US and its leaders have played an essential, critical, vital role in the region. That's happening with Bush and Colin Powell today," says Kenneth Stein, a chief Middle East adviser.

　　From this historical topography<注15> of US peacemaking in the Middle East, there are a number of general conclusions an interested member of the Bush administration might draw as this White House feels its way through the current crisis:<注16>

　　No. 1: US mediation in this volatile<注17> area of the world is crucial. Egypt and Israel would never have struck a deal<注18> in 1979 without Carter's persistence. Though he once bemoaned his role as a "postman" in the talks,<注19> he provided a crucial link between Sadat, who was more interested in concluding a deal than his aides, and Begin's top aides, who were more interested in concluding a deal than their boss.

　　No. 2: The big breakthroughs don't always come from White House pressure. Sadat's dramatic personal trip to Jerusalem set the stage for Camp David in the first place. US mediation may have made the Oslo accords<注20> possible, but they were struck in secret, in Scandinavia. Secretary of State Christopher first heard of them while on vacation in California.

　　No. 3: They really don't like each other. Carter found that Sadat and Begin so mistrusted each other that direct talks were counterproductive.<注21> At Camp David II<注22>, Clinto thought that direct contact between Barak and Arafat would create positive momentum. It didn't. Appeals to common fellowship are very American, but in the Middle East, they don't work. Negotiators have to focus on substance, not personality.<注23>

　　No. 4: There is no reverse gear<注24> on US involvement. The Bush administration must be debating what approach to take next, following Secretary of State Powell's return from the region without a hoped-for cease-fire. Whatever happens—whether it be a pause in US action or more intensive engagement—it probably won't be a complete diplomatic withdrawal. Consider Powell's own prophetic words, from his Louisville speech:<注25> "The Middle East has always needed active American engagement for there to be progress, and we will provide it, just as we have for over half a century."